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Thank you mr. Rector. 
Dear Candidate, 
 
Socio-legal studies have always had my keen interest, but personally I have never 
managed to make the full methodological swing, to feel sufficiently confident to do my own 
research in this field. Your study may not by itself have increased my competences, but it has 
certainly enhanced my eagerness to one day make the jump, or more actively seek suitable 
coalitions. I thank you for that! 
The fact that I actually re-read your thesis, after having studied it when my 
assessment was asked for, is due, not only to this challenge of method, but also to the highly 
interesting and relevant subject matter itself . I can, however, still not make up my mind about 
the intriguing picture on the front jacket of your study. What is it trying to tell us? Are the 
raised hands expressing hope or rather desperation, or maybe even both? Perhaps you can 
elucidate. 
 
More importantly though, I want to discuss the approach you take in what I regard as 
the core message you are trying to convey (on p. 152), that Weber’s proposition that 
hierarchy, such as of states, is critical to legal certainty, is false, because the architecture of 
multi-level regulatory spaces can secure legal certainty of stakeholders through participation 
in rulemaking. 
To support your critique you apply a perspective in which you place Multi Level 
regulation (MLR) against Single Scale, Hierarchic Integrated Regulation (SSHIR), such as 
that of a nation state. It puzzles me why you chose to apply a concept which in my mind is 
best reserved to point only at multi-level tiers of governance and regulation, so to a vertical 
distribution of powers. You, however, apply it to the broader phenomenon of regulatory de-
centring of the state by dispersed rulemaking (p. 54) both in vertical and horizontal ways, so 
also multi-actor.  
My first concern is that your definition rhetorically pushes MLR well away from 
hierarchy, possibly even into the realm of ‘soft law’, whereas I think that in International and 
European Law, important domains of MLR, there is indeed hierarchically binding law and we 
should not easily suggest otherwise.  
My second concern is that approaching the issue of legal certainty through the lens of 
MLR, may have kept you from looking into different modes of regulation following 
distinctive institutional environments of governance. Alternative to the Weberian logic of 
hierarchy, you could have modeled legal certainty of markets as built upon rules concerning 
information symmetry, such as of fair-trade and consumer protection, and legal certainty of 
networks as built upon inclusion of stakeholders. MLR would be a (mere) variable in the 
context of these environments - not ruling out a hierarchical framing of legal certainty. 
Perhaps the distinction you make between governance and regulation has kept you from 
choosing this approach, but it may also have kept you from building upon network theory in 
analyzing types of network rulemaking and from performing empirical research more mindful 
of the fact that perception of certainty may vary with perceptions of regulatory ‘game-types’. 
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I think this point also has bearing on the distinction between your relational and the 
authoritative model of legal certainty, but for now, could you please state your point of view 
on your choice of the MLR approach in the light of my remarks. – and perhaps also explain 
the jacket, without throwing your own hands in the air.  
 
Back-up question (not asked) 
The ML architecture of regulatory spaces can support legal certainty of stakeholders. I agree. 
Your frame to make this point is to consider legal certainty as a relational concept, tied in 
with rules of inclusion and participation (–which will hold substantive criteria for determining 
who is and who is not a (prime-)stakeholder).  The New Approach directives underpin the 
architecture fitting to this relational conceptualization of legal certainty, and readily point at 
expertise as an important criterion for participation in rulemaking.  
Your empirical research shows how legal certainty indeed comes with relationally 
relevant aspects such as access and participation.  How do these perceptions relate to what 
you call the ‘legal effect’ of MLR? Would you go as far as to say that the relational 
perspective can also normatively support such legal effect? When we look at the authoritative 
concept of legal certainty, following regulatory hierarchy, then clearly the case of linking 
legal effect to legal certainty can be made.  But in MLR or network rulemaking I am not so 
sure. If it leads to standards, what is their legal status? Is there legal effect to the extent that a 
court or administrative authority, away from the comfort-zone of negotiation, will or shall 
reward hitherto claims of legal certainty?  
 
Under the New Approach regime, the legal effect of standards follows from the presumed 
conformity with ‘essential requirements’, but that is an authoritative argument, following – 
yes indeed – MLR-hierarchy! Thus perception meets normative safeguards. But do you agree 
that if such a framework does not exist, stakeholders may perceive legal certainty through 
participation, but ‘outside’, this need not be met with concurrent legal practice, building on 
hitherto norms – unless we accept that there is a legally relevant authoritative or at least 
assertory ground, such as expertise, which can support claims to legal certainty? 
 
 
